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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
USURY-INSTALLMENT SALES CONTRACTS: LIMITATION OF THE SCOPE
OF THE TimE rRICE DocTmNE-National Bank of Commerce of Se-
attle v. Thomsen, 80 Wn. 2d 406,495 P.2d 332 (1972).
In 1965 Greg Thomsen entered into an agreement with Carter
Motors for the purchase of an automobile. In addition to signing a
purchase order, Thomsen executed a conditional sales contract which
provided that payments were to be made to the National Bank of
Commerce (NBC) and showed a time price differential' of $242.15,
the equivalent of a 14.61 percent annual finance charge. A Carter
Motors salesman had requested that Thomsen finance the purchase
through NBC, which had supplied the contract form and other docu-
ments used in the transaction. Carter Motors immediately assigned the
contract to NBC pursuant to a financing agreement which provided
that Carter Motors would sell to NBC such conditional sales contracts
as NBC approved. Thomsen later defaulted on the contract and, when
sued by NBC for the remaining payments, alleged that the 14.61 per-
cent finance charge violated Washington's usury statute.2 The trial
1. The term "time price differential" refers to a figure representing the difference
between the cash price of an item and the total cost of purchasing that item on credit.
See General Electric Credit Corp. v. Lunsford, 209 Va. 743, 167 S.E.2d 414, 418
(1969). The conditional sales contract executed between Greg Thomsen and Carter
Motors actually used the term "time price differential." National Bank of Commerce
of Seattle v. Thomsen, 80 Wn. 2d 406, 407, 495 P.2d 332, 334 (1972).
2. The usury statute involved in Thomsen, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.020 (1959),
provided:
Any rate of interest not exceeding twelve percent per annum agreed to in writ-
ing by the parties to the contract, shall be legal, and no person shall directly or
indirectly take or receive in money, goods or thing in action, or in any other way,
any greater interest, sum or value for the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods or thing in action than twelve percent per annum.
That statute was amended by the legislature in 1967, and now reads:
Any rate of interest not exceeding twelve percent per annum agreed to in writ-
ing by the parties to the contract shall be legal, and no person shall directly or
indirectly take or receive in money, goods or things in action, or in any other
way, any greater interest, sum or value for the loan or forbearance of any
money, goods or things in action than twelve percent per annum: Provided, That
in any loan of money in which the funds advanced do not exceed the sum of five
hundred dollars, a setup charge may be charged and collected by the lender, and
such setup charge shall not be considered interest hereunder: Provided Further,
That such setup charge does not exceed four percent of the amount of funds ad-
vanced, or fifteen dollars, whichever is the lesser, except that on loans of under
one hundred dollars a minimum not exceeding four dollars may be so charged.
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.020 (Supp. 1972).
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court ruled in favor of NBC, viewing the transaction as a bona fide
conditional sales contract outside the purview of the usury statute. On
appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed. Held: The relation-
ship between Thomsen and NBC was that of borrower and lender;
thus, the 14.61 percent annual charge constituted interest in excess of
the 12 percent maximum allowed by the usury statute. National Bank
of Commerce of Seattle v. Thomsen, 80 Wn. 2d 406, 495 P.2d 332
(1972).
Courts have long relied upon the dichotomy between interest rates
under a loan and time price charges under an installment sales con-
tract in ruling that time price charges are outside of the usury stat-
utes.3 Although some jurisdictions recently have narrowed the cir-
cumstances to which the time price doctrine will be applied, 4 the
Thomsen decision adopts an agency theory which goes further than
any previous case in imposing limitations upon the application of the
doctrine. This note examines some of the more important aspects of
Thomsen, particularly the court's limitation of the scope of the time
price doctrine, the failure of the majority to issue a prospective ruling,
and the effect of the decision upon the Retail Installment Sales Act.5
I. THE TIME PRICE DOCTRINE
Historically, courts have been troubled with the application of
usury laws to sales of goods on credit. Since legislative prohibitions
generally were couched in terms of interest rates for a "loan" or "for-
bearance," 6 sellers contended that even though their credit price ex-
ceeded their cash price by more than the lawful interest rate, the
transaction was not usurious because there was no loan or forbear-
ance. 7 Courts generally agreed, and the time price doctrine became a
well-established exception to the usury laws.8
3. See Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wn. 2d 378, 156 P.2d 408 (1945). See also notes 6-8
and accompanying text infra.
4. See notes 11-12 and accompanying text infra.
5. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 63.14 (Supp. 1972).
6. Illustrative of such legislation is WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.020 (1959).
as amended, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.020 (Supp. 1972). which is set forth in note
2 supra. See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R. 3d 1065, 1070-71 (1967).
7. See note 9 infra.
8. See, e.g., Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (I Black) 115 (1861) (established the time
price exception to the usury laws in the United States); Wilson v. J.E. French Co.,
214 Cal. 188, 4 P.2d 537 (1931); Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wn. 2d 378, 156 P.2d 408
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During the last three decades, however, judicial reaction to the time
price doctrine has been less favorable. Apparently regarding the dis-
tinction between a credit sale and a loan or forbearance as somewhat
unrealistic,9 courts have limited the scope of the doctrine. Since the
time price doctrine requires that a bona fide credit sale take place be-
fore the transaction falls outside the usury statute,' 0 courts have lim-
ited its application by finding particular transactions to be only
schemes to avoid the usury laws. Such rulings are based upon a
number of factors, including a close relationship between the seller
and the finance company to which the paper is assigned and the lack
of a genuine opportunity for the buyer to choose between a credit and
cash price." A few recent decisions have further eroded the time price
doctrine by ruling that it is inapplicable to credit sales under a re-
volving charge arrangement.' 2
(1945). See generally Note, Judicial and Legislative Treatment of "Usurious" Credit
Sales, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1145-46 (1958); Comment, Retail Installment Sales---
History and Development of Regulation, 45 MARQ. L. REV. 555, 560-63 (1962).
9. The traditional disiinction between a loan or 'forbearance and a credit sale
was based on the position of the borrower. Courts felt that the borrower might be
desperately in need of financial assistance and therefore at the mercy of the lender,
whereas the buyer could refrain from making a purchase if he felt that the cash or
credit price asked by the seller was too high. See General Acceptance Corp. v. Wein-
rich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 78, 262 S.W. 425, 428 (1924). Regardless of the historical
validity of that distinction, present day consumer practices render it obsolete. The in-
stallment purchase has become a common method of immediately obtaining those
goods that one cannot pay for or afford until smie future date. Since it is likely that
the modern consumer's demand for goods is, in most instances, as great as his de-
mand for loans to pay medical or other non-purchase expenses, there is no more com-
pulsion to seek a loan than to purchase on time. This demise of the rationale support-
ing the time price doctrine should lead to its eventual rejection.
10. A bona fide credit sale requires the seller to quote both a cash price and a
credit price. See, e.g., Bryant v. Securities Investment Co., 233 Miss. 740, 102 So. 2d
701 (1958); Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wn. 2d 378, 156 P.2d 408 (1945); Commercial
Credit Co. v. Tarwater, 215 Ala. 123, 110 So. 39 (1926).
11. See, e.g., Daniel v. First National Bank of Birmingham, 227 F.2d 353 (5th
Cir. 1955), affd on rehearing, 228 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1956), second appeal, 239
F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1956); Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601,
249 S.W.2d 973 (1952); Lloyd v. Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W.2d 198 (1963).
See generally cases cited in Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065, 1124-60 (1967). Note that
some courts have continued to apply the time price rule despite the existence of cir-
cumstances from which other courts would infer a scheme to avoid the usury laws.
See, e.g., Aglio v. Carousel, Inc., 34 Misc. 2d 79, 228 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1962); Equip-
ment Finance, Inc. v. Grannas, 207 Pa. Super. 363, 218 A.2d 81 (1966).
12. See, e.g., Rollinger v. J.C. Penney Co., 192 N.W.2d 699 (S.D. 1971); State v.
J.C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970); But cf. Sliger v. R.H. Macy
and Co., 59 N.J. 465, 283 A.2d 904 (1971); Dennis v. Sedrs, Roebuck and Co., 223
Tenn. 415, 446 S.W.2d 260 (1969). See also Note, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 296. The re-
volving charge arrangements have been distinguished from the traditional time sale in
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The time price doctrine is a recognized exception to the usury laws
in Washington. The leading Washington case is Hafer v. Spaeth, .3
which involved the purchase of a piano on an installment basis. After
the buyer defaulted, the seller assigned his claim against the purchaser
to a third party for collection. Although the finance charges exceeded
the allowable interest rates under the usury statute, the court held that
charges for time purchases under installment sales contracts are out-
side the usury statute. 14
When faced with the usury problem again in Thomsen, the court
observed that many authorities had criticized the rationale of cases
like Hafer as anachronistic. 5 The majority refused to overrule Hafer,
however, and instead reached the result in Thomsen by finding an
agency relationship between Carter Motors and NBC.1 6 The court
found that Carter Motors had represented to Thomsen that NBC
would finance the transaction, and that this representation, even if
unauthorized, was ratified when NBC accepted the contract.1 7 Thus
Carter Motors was held to be an agent in transacting a loan between
Greg Thomsen and NBC.' 8 The majority stated that the arrangement
was never a true conditional sale, but constituted a cash sale by
Carter Motors and a loan by NBC.
Although the Thomsen court's refusal to overrule Hafer leaves the
time price doctrine intact, it is uncertain to what extent the agency
theory utilized by the majority has limited the scope of the doctrine.
The opinion does not isolate the particular facts the court relied upon
in finding an agency relationship. It appears that the express financing
agreement, the request by Carter Motors that Thomsen finance the
transaction through NBC, the fact that NBC furnished conditional
that the agreement is entered into prior to any sale, no time price is quoted to the
buyer, and the account may cover a number of sales. For a discussion of other dis-
tinguishing characteristics, see State v. J.C. Penney, supra, and Note, 1971 Wis. L. REV.
296.
13. 22 Wn. 2d 378, 156 P.2d 408 (1945).
14. The court did note, however, that it would look beyond the form of the trans-
action to assure that it was a bona fide sale and purchase, and not a mere subterfuge
to circumvent the usury laws. Id. at 386, 156 P.2d at 412.
15. 80 Wn. 2d at 411, 495 P.2d at 336-37. See text accompanying note 19 infra.
16. The court's refusal to overrule Hafer is consistent with its agency theory. The
seller in Hafer apparently had no close connections with the assignee which would
justify finding, as the court did in Thomsen, that the seller was merely the agent of
the assignee in negotiating a loan with the purchaser. See text accompanying notes
17-18 infra.
17. 80 Wn. 2d at 413-14, 495 P.2d at 338.
18. The usury statute expressly provides that the acts of an agent in loaning
money shall bind the principal. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.030(2) (Supp. 1972).
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sales contract forms and other documents to Carter Motors, and the
immediate assignment of the conditional sales contract to NBC were
important factors in the court's determination. Whether all or only a
portion of those factors are required to establish an agency relation-
ship, and whether additional factors will also be deemed relevant are
questions left unanswered by Thomsen.
It is also uncertain whether the court will limit future rulings to an
agency theory. Dictum in Thomsen indicates that Hafer and the entire
time price doctrine may be vulnerable. After acknowledging the criti-
cism of Hafer's rationale, the majority stated:19
If it is true that persons who purchase on installment terms automo-
biles and other items of merchandise which they feel they need are
under economic pressure as severe as that which influences borrowers
of money to accept oppressive terms, then there is no logical reason to
make a distinction between the exacting of excessive charges for defer-
ring payments and the exacting of such charges for loaning money.
Also significant in predicting future judicial trends is the concurring
opinion, signed by three majority justices, which stated that Hafer
should be expressly overruled. 20
As a practical matter, the present impact of Thomsen on condi-
tional sales financing is reduced considerably by the Retail Installment
Sales Act,21 which regulates retail installment sales of consumer goods
and services. When Thomsen purchased the automobile in 1965, the
Act contained no limitations on service charges. 22 However, in 1967
the legislature amended the Act to impose an 18 percent limitation on
service charges,23 and in 1968 Initiative 245 reduced the ceiling to 12
percent.24 Thus, since both the usury statute and the Retail Installment
Sales Act currently provide 12 percent limitations,25 the labeling of a
19. 80Wn.2dat411,495P.2dat336-37.
20. 80 Wn. 2d at 416, 495 P.2d at 339. The concurring judges thought that
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.020 (1959) prohibited finance charges in excess of 12 per
cent regardless of the form of the transaction, thus concluding that time price charges
under installment sales contracts were finance charges within the purview of the usury
statute.
21. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 63.14 (Supp. 1972).
22. "Service charges" are defined essentially as finance charges for the privilege of
purchasing on time. WASH. REV. CODE § 63.14.0 10 (Supp. 1972).
23. Ch. 234, §§ 3,7,8, [1967] WASH. SESS. LAWS 1133, 1139-40 (amended 1968).
24. Ch. 2, [1969] WASH. Sass. LAWS, now incorporated in WASH. REV. CODE §§
63.14.040, 63.14.120, 63.14.130 (Supp. 1972).
25. Note, however, that the 1967 amendment to WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.020
allows setup charges. See note 2 supra for the text of that statute.
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transaction as a loan or an installment sale is at least temporarily
immaterial in determining allowable finance charges for sales of goods
and services to consumers.
However, even with the 12 percent limit imposed by the Retail In-
stallment Sales Act, Thomsen is still relevant to present transactions.
Since all nonconsumer sales fall outside the scope of R.C.W. ch.
63.14 and continue to be subject to the time price doctrine, the
Thomsen holding will directly affect any nonconsumer credit sale in
which the time price differential exceeds the maximum legal interest
rate under the usury statute. In addition, future legislative alteration
of allowable rates under either the usury statute or the Retail Install-
ment Sales Act would make the Thomsen opinion crucial to consumer
installment sales. 26 If Thomsen is interpreted as applying only where
there is such a nexus as that which existed between Carter Motors and
NBC, the state legislature can still, for example, raise the service
charge ceiling for retail installment sales contracts without changing
the usury statute. The only remaining question would be what transac-
tions fall within the ambit of the usury statute under the Thomsen
analysis. On the other hand, if Thomsen foreshadows future court
rejection of the time price doctrine, the legislature cannot raise per-
missible service charges for retail installment sales transactions
without raising the interest limitations on loans or redefining the trans-
actions covered by the usury statute so as to explicitly exclude install-
ment sales contracts.27 Thus, the effect of Thomsen on interest rates
and service charges may be substantial.
II. LACK OF PROSPECTIVE RULING
The major difficulty with the Thomsen opinion is its failure to issue
a prospective ruling28 in light of the presumed reliance by the finan-
cial community upon the traditional application of the time price doc-
trine endorsed in Hafer. That detrimental reliance in all probability
has been extensive; Thomsen could jeopardize transactions whose
26. The Washington legislature is frequently presented with proposals for altering
allowable finance charges. See, e.g., S. B. 407, H. B. 783, WASh. LEG., 41st SESS.
(1969) (proposal to decrease interest rates for consumer installment loans under
$5,000).
27. For a discussion of possible legislative action, see notes 50-52 and accompany-
ing text infra.
28. See notes 36-42 and accompanying text infra.
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aggregate value amounts to millions of dollars.29 As previously indi-
cated, the Retail Installment Sales Act has prohibited any service
charge over 12 percent on installment sales of consumer goods and
services since 1968. However, under the time price doctrine approved
in Hafer, all nonconsumer installment sales outside the purview of
R.C.W. ch. 63.14 could legally contain finance charges in excess of
12 percent.30 It is probable that the time price differential under many
of these nonconsumer sales exceeds the 12 percent limit, particularly
where discounting is involved.31 Also, many consumer installment
29. The aggregate value of transactions potentially affected by any decision in the
installment sales area is tremendous. In recent years the outstanding short and inter-
mediate term installment consumer credit in the United States, primarily installment
sales contracts and direct installment loans for the purchase of consumer goods, has
continuously exceeded $100 billion. At the end of 1971 the figure was in excess of
$137 billion. A large percentage of that credit consists of installment sales contracts
such as that involved in Thomsen. See 52 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Pub. No. 8,
SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS S-17 to S-18 (August 1972); U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, BUSINESS STATISTICS 92-94 (18th biennial ed. 1971). Washington's share of
that $100 billion industry is quite substantial. For example, in 1968 consumer install-
ment sales contracts totalling in excess of $200 million were executed in Washington,
all of which could, before the December 5, 1968" effective date of Initiative 245,
legally contain finance charges in excess of 12 per cent. See G. Gordon, J. Wheatley,
F. Gaedeke, H. Hallaq & D. McNabb, The Impact of a Consumer Credit Interest
Limitation Law, Washington State: Initiative 245, 45, 1970 (Graduate School of
Business Administration, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington). Non-
consumer installment sales contracts would probably equal or exceed that $200 mil-
lion per year figure. A retroactive application of the statutory usury penalties (which
provide that the debtor can recover twice the interest paid plus interest accrued) to
such a vast amount of paper would have a disastrous effect on Washington's financial
community. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.030 (Supp. 1972).
For a discussion of the applicability of the statute of limitations, see note 32 infra.
30. Note that Thomsen will not affect credit sales to a corporate purchaser, un-
less an individual is personally liable on the installment sales contract, since corpora-
tions are now explicitly excepted from the protection of the usury laws. WASH. REV.
CODE § 19.52.030(1) (Supp. 1972). However, there is a vast amount of nonconsumer
installment purchasing outside this exception, most notably by farmers and other
proprietorships and partnerships.
31. Discounting occurs when the seller exacts a finance charge from the purchaser
pursuant to an installment sales contract and then transfers the paper to a lender for
consideration which is less than the face amount of the instrument. The initial finance
charge plus the discount often exceeds the maximum allowable interest rate. Whether
the discount constitutes interest charged to the debtor for usury purposes is not al-
ways clear. The general rule is that a bona fide sale of commercial paper cannot be
usurious, regardless of the profit made. Baske v. Russell, 67 Wn. 2d 268, 270-71, 407
P.2d 434, 436 (1965). However, where an intermediary transacts the loan and takes,
part of the principal as a commission, the commission becomes part of the interest
paid for the loan. Id.
It appears that sellers and lenders in the same position as Carter Motors and NBC
previously considered any discount arrangement as a sale of commercial paper by the
seller or a Iban by the lender to the seller, all outside the purview of the usury statute.
See Respondent's Answer to Petition for Rehearing at 19-20, National Bank of Com-
merce of Seattle v. Thomsen, 80 Wn. 2d 406, 495 P.2d 332. However, under the
agency theory set forth in Thomsen such discounts will presumably become part of
485
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sales transacted before Initiative 245 became effective on December
5, 1968, may contain credit charges in excess of 12 percent.32
The severity of the penalties for usury weighs heavily in favor of a
prospective ruling. The usury statute specifies that a creditor trans-
acting a usurious loan is entitled only to the principal less twice the
amount of any interest paid and less all accrued and unpaid interest. 33
Under this formula, the retroactive application of Thomsen would
allow the debtor involved in a transaction labeled usurious by this new
ruling to recover a substantial sum, 34 particularly if he had paid on
the interest charged the debtor, since the loan is between the buyer and the third
party lender, with the seller acting only as an intermediary agent.
32. The vulnerability of these transactions to a retroactive Thomsen ruling de-
pends upon an application of the relevant statute of limitations period. There are
various statutory provisions covering the question. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.032
(Supp. 1972) (six months to initiate declaratory judgment action); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.86.120 (Supp. 1972) (four years to bring action for unfair practices, which
under WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.036 (Supp. 1972) includes transacting a usurious
contract); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.080(3) (1967) (three year limitation period
within which to assert quasi contractual right); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.040(2)
(1959) (six year statute of limitations for an action upon a written contract). There
is an unresolved conflict between the latter two provisions. The three year limitation
period was applied in Edwards v. Surety Fin. Co., 176 Wash. 534, 30 P.2d 225
(1934). However, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.030(1) (Supp. 1972) impliedly allows a
suit by the debtor to recover usury under a contract, referring to an "action on such
contract." This could invoke the six year statute of limitations for an action upon a
written contract. See generally Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 401 (1956). Usury is also rec-
ognized as an affirmative defense. Malotte v. Gorton, 75 Wn. 2d 306, 311, 450 P.2d
820, 823 (1969). Since under WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.040(2) (1959) an action on a
written contract can be commenced within six years, usury presumably could be as-
serted as a defense throughout the six year period. See J. C. Felthouse & Co. v.
Bresnahan, 145 Wash. 548, 549, 260 P. 1075, 1076 (1927) (involving fraud), where
the court acknowledged "the rule ... that the statute of limitations never runs against
a defense arising out of the transaction sued upon by the plaintiff."
There is also considerable uncertainty concerning when the limitation period com-
mences to run. It may run from each actual payment of usurious interest. See Lloyd
v. Fidelity Nat. Bank, 169 Wash. 107, 13 P.2d 504 (1932) (application of federal
law). However, some jurisdictions hold that the statute of limitations does not com-
mence to run until the loan is fully paid. See, e.g., Shirley v. Britt, 152 Cal. App. 2d
666, 313 P.2d 875, 877 (1957); O'Malley v. United States Building & Loan Ass'n.
50 Idaho 583, 298 P. 675 (1931). Other courts have held that the limitations period
commences when the debtor's aggregate payments equal the principal plus lawful
interest. See, e.g., Atlanta Sav. Bank v. Spencer, 107 Ga. 629, 33 S.E. 878 (1899).
See generally Annot., 108 A.L.R. 622 (1937). Present Washington case law does not
resolve either the question of which limitations period is applicable or when it com-
mences to run.
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.030 (Supp. 1972).
34. The statutory language of WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.030 (1959) initially
created uncertainties as to whether the debtor could take affirmative action to recover
the usury penalties; the statute could be read as allowing usury only as a defense.
However, the Washington Supreme Court has ruled that there is a common law right
to recover the usury penalties based upon an action of assumpsit. See Edwards v.
Surety Fin. Co., 176 Wash. 534, 30 P.2d 225 (1934).
The amendatory provisions of WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.030(1) (Supp. 1972) now
imply that the debtor can sue to recover the usury penalties.
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the contract for a lengthy period. In addition to this windfall, the
debtor may also recover court costs and a reasonable attorney's fee. 35
In view of the burden that a retroactive application of the rule in
Thomsen will impose on lenders, the decision would have been an
ideal situation in which to utilize a prospective ruling.36 Through that
device the court could have eliminated a rule it considered outdated
without jeopardizing prior contracts entered into in reliance on judi-
cial precedent.37
The majority in Thomsen did not discuss the possible retroactivity
of its opinion, although the decision was applied retroactively to the
transaction in question. The court's silence may exclude the possibility
of a solely prospective ruling which would insulate similar transac-
tions entered into prior to the Thomsen decision. The only utilization
of a prospective ruling by the Washington Supreme Court was in State
ex rel. Finance Committee v. Martin,3 8 which involved a challenge to
the constitutionality of a bond issue. In overruling a previous decision,
the court expressly stated that the ruling was to be applied prospec-
tively, even as to the litigants, from the date the remittitur was filed.39
35. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.030 (Supp. 1972).
36. For an analysis of various aspects of the prospectivity issue, see Currier, Time
and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201 (1965);
Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time,
79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965); Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of
Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631 (1967); Note, Prospectivity and Retro-
activity of Supreme Court Constitutional Interpretation, 5 U. RICH. L. REV.
129 (1970).
37. Two other jurisdictions have ruled prospectively when altering the traditional
application of the time price rule. See Hare v. General Contract Corp., 220 Ark. 601,
249 S.W.2d 973 (1952); Rollinger v. J.C. Penney Co., 192 N.W.2d 699 (S.D. 1971).
See also Note, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 296, 307.
38. 62 Wn. 2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963).
39. Id. at 662, 384 P.2d at 843. In issuing its prospective ruling, the Martin court
stated:
So, to do justice, courts have devised a means of getting rid of bad rules, yet, at
the same time, preserving stare decisis. Rules of law, like governments, should
not be changed for light or transient causes; but, when time and events prove the
need for a change, changed they must be.
If rights have vested under a faulty rule, or a constitution misinterpreted, or a
statute misconstrued, or where, as here, subsequent events demonstrate a ruling
to be in error, prospective overruling becomes a logical and integral part of stare
decisis by enabling the courts to right a wrong without doing more injustice than
is sought to be corrected. By means of this doctrine, courts of the most prudent
and careful tradition can move boldly to right the very wrong they have been
traditionally perpetuating under the old, rigidly-applied, single-minded view of the
doctrine of stare decisis. The courts can act to do that which ought to be done,
free from the fear that the law itself is being undone.
Id. at 666, 384 P.2d at 845. That statement of the supporting rationale for a prospec-
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Thus bonds issued prior to the Martin ruling were not jeopardized.
Martin is relevant because the court expressly ruled as to prospectivity
at the time it altered prior case law, not leaving the issue for a future
opinion. 40 Thus, the Thomsen court's failure to mention prospectivity
may imply its rejection of a prospective ruling. 41
There remains a remote possibility that Thomsen will be applied
prospectively as to all parties except Greg Thomsen. The majority
opinion did not expressly mention retroactivity; thus, the Washington
court could later rule that the question was not disposed of by
Thomsen. Since it is an approved appellate procedure for a court to
rule retroactively as to the present litigants and prospectively as to all
others,42 the scope of Thomsen still could be limited. Perhaps the
Washington court will follow this latter procedure once it squarely
faces the possible adverse financial impact of Thomsen.
III. RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES ACT
The judicial philosophy behind decisions such as Thomsen is pre-
sumably consumer oriented. Thus it is ironic that one possible result
of the Thomsen court's expansion of the coverage of the usury statute
is to curtail drastically the effect of another consumer protection law,
the Retail Installment Sales Act. That Act regulates retail installment
tive ruling is directly applicable to the Thomsen case. For a discussion of the prospec-
tivity issue as it existed immediately prior to Martin, see Comment, The Prospective
Decision-A Useful "Tool of the Trade," 38 WASH. L. REv. 584 (1963).
40. Other jurisdictions limiting an alteration of the scope of the time price doc-
trine to future transactions have also issued an express statement of prospectivity in
the initial decision. See Hare v. General Contract Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d
973 (1952); Rollinger v. J.C. Penney Co., 192 N.W.2d 699 (S.D. 1971). See gen-
erally articles cited in note 36 supra.
41. The dissenting judges apparently felt that Thomsen was to be applied retro-
actively to all previous transactions when they stated:
Finally, the opinion [Thomsen] may solve one litigant's immediate problem.
but it does so by adopting a view that is decidedly minority in nature. It also
makes a 180 degree turn which may place in jeopardy thousands of long-time com-
mercial transactions made in good faith and in reliance upon our prior adher-
ence to the view held by most courts and other legal authorities. This not only
may have an adverse effect upon assignee banking institutions but on many small
individual assignee holders of such paper.
80 Wn. 2d at 418, 495 P.2d at 340.
42. See Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Over-
ruling, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 631, 638 (1967). For a case in which this procedure was
applied, see Rollinger v. J.C. Penney, 192 N.W.2d 699 (S.D. 1971). For an analysis
of prospectivity, see the articles cited in note 36 supra.
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sales of consumer goods and services and, in addition to the 12 per-
cent limit it imposes on service charges, provides various protections
such as: preservation of the buyer's defenses against an assignee or
due course holder,43 a requirement that any unearned service charge
be refunded when the buyer prepays the time balance, 44 a provision
under which a customer making subsequent installment purchases
before earlier purchases are paid off is entitled to have later payments
applied ratably towards the earlier purchases according to the original
purchase price,45 and a "cooling off" period whereby a sale solicited
outside the buyer's place of business may be cancelled within three
business days. 46
It appears that under the reasoning of Thomsen these protections
will be denied to a vast number of consumers. This result could occur
because R.C.W. ch. 63.14 applies only to retail installment contracts
and charge agreements between retail buyers and sellers;47 the statute
does not apply to cash sales or loans, the labels the court affixed to the
Thomsen transaction. The Thomsen majority eliminated any lingering
doubt regarding rejection of the applicability of the Retail Installment
Sales Act when it stated:48
Since the act [R.C.W. ch. 63.14] does not purport to regulate
third-party financing of purchases of goods or services, it does not
cover the question presented in this case.
R.C.W. ch. 63.14 makes no distinction between the service charge
limitation and the other protections; therefore, the Act may now apply
only to those installment sales where there is not such a nexus between
the seller and the third party financier as that which existed between
Carter Motors and NBC. Perhaps the court did not intend such a
43. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 63.14.020, .150 (Supp. 1972).
44. WASH. REV. CODE § 63.14.080 (Supp. 1972).
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 63.14.110 (Supp. 1972).
46. WASH. REV. CODE § 63.14.154(1)(c) (Supp. 1972). This three day limit is
effective as ofJanuary 1, 1973. Under prior law, there was a one day limit.
The Retail Installment Sales Act contains other protections for the consumer, in-
cluding a prohibition against clauses whereby the buyer consents to suit fn a foreign
county, WASH. REV. CODE § 63.14.150 (Supp. 1972), and authority for a declaratory
judgment action to test the legality of the service charges tinder a contract, WASH.
REV. CODE § 63.14.152 (Supp. 1972).
47. See WASH. REV. CODE § 63.14.010 (Supp. 1972).
48. 80 Wn. 2d at 412,495 P.2d at 337.
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result. If it did not, the court in a future opinion could limit the
Thomsen agency theory to the usury area, thereby preserving the
other protections of R.C.W. ch. 63.14 for consumers in the same situ-
ation as Greg Thomsen.
CONCLUSION
The Thomsen case made significant inroads on the somewhat an-
achronistic distinction between a loan and a credit sale. In so doing,
however, the opinion generated substantial uncertainties for both
financial institutions and consumers. 49 The court might easily have
accomplished the result it sought in Thomsen without creating the
accompanying problems if instead of adopting an agency theory it had
prospectively overruled Hafer, thereby eliminating the time price doc-
trine. Such a ruling would have avoided the problems of retroactivity
and would have preserved the protections of R.C.W. ch. 63.14 for
consumer sales. In view of the court's strong suggestion that the future
vitality of Hafer is in doubt, it is unclear why the court did not take
this opportunity to hasten the demise of the time price doctrine.
49. Another uncertainty presented by Thomsen is its impact in the disclosure
area. The Retail Installment Sales Act sets forth certain mandatory formalities for
disclosing the terms of a financing arrangement. WASH. REV. CODE § 63.14.040 (Supp.
1972). Since the applicability of WASH. REV. CODE ch. 63.14 may have been nar-
rowed considerably by Thomsen, credit arrangements such as that involved in Thom-
sen may no longer be subject to those disclosure requirements. However, creditors
must still comply with federal truth-in-lending provisions. 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.
(1970); 12 C.F.R. § 226 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
Counsel should also take note of the dissenting opinion and its possible future im-
plications. Thomsen, 80 Wn. 2d at 417, 495 P.2d at 340. The dissent argues that the
decision should have been based upon the single document requirement of WASH.
REV. CODE § 63.14.020 (1963):
Every retail installment contract shall be contained in a single document which
shall contain the entire agreement of the parties including any promissory notes
or other evidences of indebtedness between the parties relating to the transac-
tion....
Since Greg Thomsen initially signed a purchase order that lacked the essential terms
(only later signing a conditional sales contract that set forth the entire agreement),
the dissenting judges felt the decision should be based upon that failure. Although a
dissenting opinion lacks the force of law, this dissent was signed by three judges and
could be indicative of future court action.
Note, however, that for the sale of motor vehicles, WASH. REV. CODE § 46.70.130
(1961) requires a separate itemization of the proposed contract terms. A separate
purchase order is also contemplated by WASH. REV. CODE § 46.70.180(4) (1969),
which is designed to prevent dealer abuse of such a document. These statutory pro-
visions create doubt as to the validity of the position taken in the dissenting opinion.
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Since Thomsen dealt almost exclusively with statutory law, it is
possible for the state legislature to clarify matters considerably. Reme-
dial legislative action should involve a definitional revision of both the
usury statute and Retail Installment Sales Act. Thus, for example, the
Retail Installment Sales Act could be drafted so as to apply explicitly
to the transaction involved in Thomsen; correlatively, a proviso could
be added to the usury statute specifically excluding such a transac-
tion.50 A revision should also eliminate other uncertainties, such as
whether a discount of paper to a third party financier is to be consi-
dered part of the finance charge subject to statutory limits.5 ' An alter-
native statutory proposal could involve a comprehensive revision of
all legislation dealing with loans and credit sales. One example of such
a proposal is the UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, presently being
considered by the Washington legislature.52 Regardless of the direc-
tion taken by the legislature, it should act quickly to eliminate the
ambiguities created by Thomsen.
P.A.H.
50. This could easily be accomplished by stating that a "loan" or "forbearance"
does not include an installment sales contract even though assigned to a third party
financier, and correspondingly, that the Retail Installment Sales Act does cover such a
transaction if it involves a retail sale of goods or services to a consumer. Under such
a formulation, the definition of an installment sales contract must explicitly encom-
pass transactions such as that involved in Thomsen so as to avoid the "direct loan"
label affixed to the installment sales contract in that case.
51. See note 31 supra. Any legislation should also explicitly authorize an action
by a debtor to recover the usury penalties and establish a statute of limitations period
within which such an action must be commenced. See'notes 32 and 34 supra.
52. S. B. 213, WASH. LEG., 42d Sass. (1971).
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